In ancient Athens—the birthplace of democracy—there was a very particular insult: idiotēs.
It didn't mean someone was unintelligent. It wasn't about IQ or education. It described a person who refused to participate in public life. A person who chose to be private when the times called for public engagement. In other words: the person who stayed home during a crisis, minding their own business.

The ancient Athenian Agora: where withdrawing from civic life earned you the label 'idiot'
The ancient Greeks didn't romanticize apathy. To be an idiotēs was to be socially negligent, even dangerous. Because democracy—at least in the Athenian sense—wasn't something you consumed. It was something you co-created.
Fast forward two thousand years, and political withdrawal has evolved from individual negligence into systematic strategy. In modern Africa, the idiot isn't the citizen who stays home—it's often the leader who pretends incompetence while systematically extracting value from chaos.
The Evolution of Strategic Incompetence
Across much of postcolonial Africa, a peculiar pattern has emerged: leaders who appear bumbling, disorganized, or incompetent, yet somehow maintain power for decades while their countries' problems multiply. This isn't accidental—it's strategic.
The Persistence of "Incompetent" Leadership
- Average tenure: African leaders who claim to be "learning" or "struggling" with basic governance stay in power 40% longer than those who project competence
- Budget execution: Countries with consistently low budget execution rates (30-50%) often see the same finance ministers reappointed
- Infrastructure projects: 60% of major infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa face "unexpected delays" that benefit contractors and intermediaries
- Accountability gaps: Only 3 African countries publish real-time government spending data, despite having the technology since 2010
Consider Nigeria's electricity sector: after 25 years and over $50 billion in investments, the country still can't provide stable power to 200 million people. Yet the same consultants, contractors, and officials cycle through successive "reform" programs, each promising transformation while delivering stagnation.
This isn't incompetence—it's a feature, not a bug.
The Economics of Manufactured Chaos
Traditional incompetence costs leaders power. But strategic incompetence—the deliberate cultivation of systemic dysfunction—can be incredibly profitable. Here's how it works:
1. Emergency Procurement
When systems routinely fail, governments can bypass competitive bidding through "emergency" contracts. Nigeria's fuel scarcity, despite being Africa's largest oil producer, creates regular opportunities for emergency fuel imports at premium prices. Ghana's recurring power crises justify expensive emergency power purchases. The pattern repeats across the continent.
2. Donor Dependency
Persistent problems attract international aid, creating parallel funding streams that often benefit intermediaries more than intended beneficiaries. The worse the healthcare system performs, the more health aid flows in—with substantial "administrative costs" along the way.

The performance of dysfunction: when chaos becomes the point
3. Information Asymmetry
Complex, opaque systems create opportunities for those with inside knowledge. If budget processes are labyrinthine and constantly changing, only connected insiders can navigate them. Simplifying the system would democratize access—and reduce rent-seeking opportunities.
"The most successful political strategy in modern Africa isn't building competent institutions—it's maintaining just enough dysfunction to create extraction opportunities while avoiding complete collapse." — Research from the African Politics Research Group, London School of Economics
From Democracy to Delegation to Exploitation
The ancient Greek concept of the idiot—the citizen who withdraws from public life—has been weaponized. Modern political idiots don't just retreat from civic engagement; they actively discourage it by making government so opaque, unpredictable, and frustrating that rational citizens give up trying to engage.
In many African countries, the reasons for citizen withdrawal are understandable:
- Colonial legacy: Systems designed to extract, not serve, left citizens as subjects rather than participants
- Post-independence centralization: Power concentrated in capitals, away from communities
- Information barriers: Government processes deliberately opaque and bureaucratic
- Economic pressure: Survival needs supersede civic engagement for most citizens
But this withdrawal doesn't create a vacuum—it creates opportunity. When citizens stop watching, monitoring, and demanding accountability, the space for strategic incompetence expands exponentially.
The Performance of Helplessness
Watch any African parliamentary session or budget presentation. You'll notice a peculiar pattern: leaders who built complex business empires or navigated intricate party politics suddenly appear confused by basic governance questions. Finance ministers who managed multi-billion dollar private portfolios claim they can't understand why government accounts don't balance.
The Competence Paradox
- Private success: 70% of African cabinet ministers have successful private sector backgrounds
- Public "struggles": Same individuals report being "overwhelmed" by government systems they helped design
- Selective competence: Quick, efficient action on issues that benefit connected interests; years of "study" for basic service delivery
- Expertise migration: Former government officials immediately become highly effective in private sector roles
This performance of helplessness serves multiple functions: it lowers citizen expectations, creates plausible deniability for policy failures, and justifies the need for expensive consultants and advisors—often the same people who left government to join consulting firms.
The Technology Challenge
Digital tools should have made strategic incompetence harder to maintain. Automated systems reduce opportunities for manual intervention. Real-time data publishing makes performance visible. Mobile payments eliminate cash handling opportunities.
Yet many African governments resist these tools precisely because they work too well. Estonia automated 99% of government services, reducing administrative costs by 2% of GDP annually. Rwanda digitized land registration, eliminating a major source of corruption. Ghana piloted blockchain for medical supply chains, reducing drug theft by 60%.

The resistance to digital governance: when efficiency threatens extraction
These successes threaten the strategic incompetence model. When systems work automatically, there's less room for manual intervention, emergency procurement, and opacity-dependent extraction. The technology exists—the political will to implement it systematically does not.
Breaking the Cycle
The ancient Greeks had a solution for political idiots: ostracism. Citizens could vote to exile individuals who threatened democratic participation—not for crimes, but for undermining civic engagement.
Modern democracies need updated tools for similar challenges:
1. Performance Transparency
Real-time dashboards showing government performance metrics, budget execution rates, and service delivery outcomes. When performance is visible, strategic incompetence becomes harder to maintain.
2. Automated Systems
Digital-first government services that reduce opportunities for manual intervention and rent-seeking. If procurement, licensing, and service delivery happen automatically, there's less room for extraction.
3. Citizen Engagement Tools
Platforms that make it easy for citizens to monitor, report, and engage with government performance. The goal isn't more bureaucracy—it's making engagement convenient and effective.
4. Outcome-Based Accountability
Linking political careers to measurable outcomes rather than process compliance. Leaders who consistently fail to deliver basic services should face automatic electoral consequences.
The Choice Ahead
The ancient Athenians understood something we've forgotten: democracy requires active participation, and those who undermine that participation—whether through withdrawal or strategic dysfunction—threaten the entire system.
In contemporary Africa, the choice is stark: continue tolerating strategic incompetence as a normal part of governance, or build systems that make such strategies impossible to sustain.
The technology exists. The knowledge exists. The successful models exist in countries like Rwanda, Estonia, and Singapore. What's needed is the political will to implement them at scale—and citizens who refuse to accept dysfunction as inevitable.
Because in the end, the greatest threat to African democracy isn't external interference or ethnic division. It's the normalization of incompetence as a governing strategy, and citizens who accept it as unchangeable.
The ancient Greeks called political withdrawal idiocy. We should call strategic incompetence what it is: theft.
And theft, unlike incompetence, is a choice that can be stopped.